Computable randomness is about more than probabilities by Persiau, Floris et al.
Computable randomness is about more than
probabilities
Floris Persiau, Jasper De Bock, and Gert de Cooman
FLip, ELIS, Ghent University, Belgium
Abstract. We introduce a notion of computable randomness for infinite
sequences that generalises the classical version in two important ways.
First, our definition of computable randomness is associated with impre-
cise probability models, in the sense that we consider lower expectations—
or sets of probabilities—instead of classical ‘precise’ probabilities. Sec-
ondly, instead of binary sequences, we consider sequences whose elements
take values in some finite sample space. Interestingly, we find that every
sequence is computably random with respect to at least one lower ex-
pectation, and that lower expectations that are more informative have
fewer computably random sequences. This leads to the intriguing ques-
tion whether every sequence is computably random with respect to a
unique most informative lower expectation. We study this question in
some detail and provide a partial answer.
Keywords: computable randomness · coherent lower expectations · im-
precise probabilities · supermartingales · computability.
1 Introduction
When do we consider an infinite sequence 휔 = (푥1, . . . , 푥푛, . . . ), whose individual
elements 푥푛 take values in some finite sample space X, to be random? This is
actually not a fair question, because randomness is never defined absolutely,
but always relative to an uncertainty model. Consider for example an infinite
sequence generated by repeatedly throwing a single fair die and writing down
the number of eyes on each throw. In this case, we would be justified in calling
this sequence random with respect to a precise probability model that assigns
probability 1/6 to every possible outcome.
It is exactly such precise probability models that have received the most
attention in the study of randomness [2,3,11]. Early work focused on binary
sequences and the law of large numbers that such sequences, and computably
selected subsequences, were required to satisfy: an infinite binary sequence of
zeros and ones is called Church random if the relative frequencies in any com-
putably selected subsequence converge to 1/2 [2]. Schnorr, inspired by the work
of Ville, strengthened this definition by introducing a notion of computable ran-
domness [11]. On his account, randomness is about betting. The starting point
is that a precise probability model that assigns a (computable) probability 푝 to 1
and 1−푝 to 0 can be interpreted as stating that 푝 is a fair price for bet I1 (푋푖) that
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yields 1 when 푋푖 = 1 and 0 when 푋푖 = 0, for every—a priori unknown—value 푋푖 of
a binary sequence 휔 = (푥1, . . . , 푥푛, . . . ) of zeros and ones. Such a sequence is then
considered to be computably random with respect to 푝 if there is no computable
betting strategy for getting rich without bounds along 휔 without borrowing,
simply by betting according to this fair price. Notably, binary sequences that
are computably random for 푝 = 1/2 are also Church random. So here too, the
relative frequency of any element 푥 ∈ X will converge to a limit frequency along
휔 — 1/2 in the binary case for 푝 = 1/2. In fact, this is typically true for any notion
of randomness with respect to a precise probability model.
However, as has been argued extensively [7], there are various random phe-
nomena where this stabilisation is not clearly present, or even clearly absent.
Hence, only adopting precise probability models to define notions of random
sequences is too much of an idealisation. Recently, this issue was addressed
by De Cooman and De Bock for binary sequences by introducing a notion of
computable randomness with respect to probability intervals instead of pre-
cise probability models, whose lower bounds represent supremum acceptable
buying prices, and whose upper bounds represent infimum acceptable selling
prices, again for the bet I1 (푋푖) that, for every value 푥푖 of a binary sequence
휔 = (푥1, . . . , 푥푛, . . . ), yields 1 if 푋푖 = 1 and 0 otherwise [5].
On this account, relative frequencies must not necessarily converge to a limit
frequency along 휔, but may fluctuate within the probability interval.
Here, we generalise the work done by De Cooman and De Bock [5] for binary
sequences, and develop a similar concept for infinite sequences that take values in
more general finite sample spaces. To this end, we consider an even more general
framework for describing uncertainty: we use coherent lower expectations—or
sets of probability mass functions—instead of probability intervals or probabil-
ities. Loosely speaking, we say that an infinite sequence 휔 = (푥1, . . . , 푥푛, . . . )
is computably random with respect to a (forecasting system of) lower expecta-
tion(s), when there is no computable betting strategy for getting rich without
bounds along 휔 without borrowing and by only engaging in bets whose (upper)
expected profit is non-positive or negative.1
This contribution is structured as follows. We start in Section 2 with a brief
introduction to coherent lower expectations, and explain in particular their con-
nection with probabilities and their interpretation in terms of gambles and bet-
ting. Next, in Section 3, we define a subject’s uncertainty for an infinite sequence
of variables 푋1, . . . , 푋푛, . . . by introducing forecasting systems that associate with
every finite sequence (푥1, . . . , 푥푛) a coherent lower expectation for the variable
푋푛+1. This allows us to introduce corresponding betting strategies to bet on the
infinite sequence of variables along a sequence 휔 = (푥1, . . . , 푥푛, . . . ) in terms of
non-negative (strict) supermartingales. After explaining in Section 4 when such
a non-negative (strict) supermartingale is computable, we extend the existing
notion of computable randomness from precise and interval probability models
to coherent lower expectations in Section 5, and study its properties. The re-
1 A real number 푥 ∈ R is called positive if 푥 > 0, non-negative if 푥 ≥ 0, negative if
푥 < 0 and non-positive if 푥 ≤ 0.
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mainder of the paper focuses on special cases. When we restrict our attention to
stationary forecasting systems that forecast a single coherent lower expectation
in Section 6, it turns out that every sequence 휔 is computably random with
respect to at least one coherent lower expectation and that if 휔 is computably
random for some coherent lower expectation, then it is also computably random
for any coherent lower expectation that is less informative, i.e., provides fewer
gambles. This makes us question whether there is a unique most informative
coherent lower expectation for which 휔 is computably random. After inspect-
ing some examples, it turns out that such a most informative coherent lower
expectation sometimes exists, but sometimes does not. When it does not, our
examples lead us to conjecture that it ‘almost’ exists. We conclude the discussion
in Section 7 by introducing a derived notion of computable randomness with re-
spect to a gamble 푓 and an interval 퐼 by focusing on the behaviour of coherent
lower expectations on a specific gamble 푓 of their domain. It turns out that for
every gamble 푓 , a sequence 휔 is ‘almost’ computably random with respect to
some smallest interval. To adhere to the page constraints, all proofs are omitted.
They are available in an extended on-line version [9].
2 Coherent lower expectations
To get the discussion started, we consider a single uncertain variable 푋 that takes
values in some finite set X, called the sample space. A subject’s uncertainty about
the unknown value of 푋 can then be modelled in several ways. We will do so
by means of a coherent lower expectation: a functional that associates a real
number with every gamble, where a gamble 푓 : X → R is a map from the sample
space X to the real numbers. We denote the linear space of all gambles by L(X).
Definition 1. A coherent lower expectation 퐸 : L(X) → R is a real-valued func-
tional on L(X) that satisfies the following axioms. For all gambles 푓 , 푔 ∈ L(X)
and all non-negative 훼 ∈ R:
C1. min 푓 ≤ 퐸 ( 푓 ) [boundedness]
C2. 퐸 (훼 푓 ) = 훼퐸 ( 푓 ) [non-negative homogeneity]
C3. 퐸 ( 푓 ) + 퐸 (푔) ≤ 퐸 ( 푓 + 푔) [superadditivity]
We will use E to denote the set of all coherent lower expectations on L(X).
As a limit case, for any probability mass function 푝 on X, it is easy to
check that the linear expectation 퐸푝, defined by 퐸푝 ( 푓 ) ≔ ∑푥∈X 푓 (푥)푝(푥) for all
푓 ∈ L(X), is a coherent lower expectation, which corresponds to a maximally in-
formative or least conservative model for a subject’s uncertainty. More generally,
a coherent lower expectation 퐸 can be interpreted as a lower envelope of such
linear expectations. That is, there is always a (closed and convex) setM of prob-
ability mass functions such that 퐸 ( 푓 ) = min{퐸푝 ( 푓 ) : 푝 ∈ M} for all 푓 ∈ L(X)
[13]. In that sense, coherent lower expectations can be regarded as a generalisa-
tion of probabilities to (closed and convex) sets of probabilities. Alternatively,
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the lower expectation 퐸 ( 푓 ) can be interpreted directly as a subject’s supremum
buying price for the uncertain reward 푓 .
The particular interpretation that is adopted is not important for what we
intend to do here. For our purposes, the only thing we will assume is that when a
subject specifies a coherent lower expectation, every gamble 푓 ∈ L(X) such that
퐸 ( 푓 ) > 0 is desirable to him and every gamble 푓 ∈ L(X) such that 퐸 ( 푓 ) ≥ 0
is acceptable to him. We think this makes sense under both of the aforemen-
tioned interpretations. Furthermore, as we will see in Section 5, the distinction
between desirable and acceptable gambles does not matter for our definition of
computable randomness. For now, however, we proceed with both notions.
Whenever a subject specifies a coherent lower expectation, we can consider
an opponent that takes this subject up on a gamble 푓 on the unknown outcome
푋 in a betting game. Borrowing terminology from the field of game-theoretic
probabilities [12], we will refer to our subject as Forecaster and to his opponent
as Sceptic. Forecaster will only bet according to those gambles 푓 ∈ L(X) that
are acceptable to him (퐸 ( 푓 ) ≥ 0), or alternatively, those that are desirable to
him (퐸 ( 푓 ) > 0). This leads to an unknown reward 푓 (푋) for Forecaster and an
unknown reward − 푓 (푋) for Sceptic. After Sceptic selects such a gamble, the
outcome 푥 ∈ X is revealed, Forecaster receives the (possibly negative) reward
푓 (푥), and Sceptic receives the reward − 푓 (푥). Equivalently, when considering for
any coherent lower expectation 퐸 the conjugate upper expectation 퐸 , defined
as 퐸 ( 푓 ) ≔ −퐸 (− 푓 ) for all 푓 ∈ L(X), then Sceptic is allowed to bet according
to any gamble 푓 ∈ L(X) for which 퐸 ( 푓 ) ≤ 0 (or 퐸 ( 푓 ) < 0), leading to an
uncertain reward 푓 (푋) for Sceptic and an uncertain reward − 푓 (푋) for Forecaster.
In what follows, we will typically take the perspective of Sceptic. The gambles
that are available to her will thus be the gambles 푓 ∈ L(X) with non-positive
(or negative) upper expectation 퐸 ( 푓 ) ≤ 0 (퐸 ( 푓 ) < 0).
An important special case is the so-called vacuous coherent lower expecta-
tion 퐸 푣 , defined by 퐸 푣 ( 푓 ) ≔ min 푓 for all 푓 ∈ L(X). If Forecaster specifies 퐸 푣 ,
this corresponds to a very conservative attitude where he is only interested
in gambles 푓 that give him a guaranteed non-negative (or positive) gain, i.e.,
min 푓 ≥ 0 (min 푓 > 0), implying that Sceptic has a guaranteed non-negative (or
positive) loss, i.e., max 푓 ≤ 0 (max 푓 < 0).
Example 2. Consider an experiment with three possible outcomes 퐴, 퐵 and 퐶,
i.e., X ≔ {퐴, 퐵, 퐶}, and three probability mass functions 푝0, 푝1 and 푝2 defined
by (푝0 (퐴), 푝0 (퐵), 푝0 (퐶)) ≔ (0, 1/2, 1/2), (푝1 (퐴), 푝1 (퐵), 푝1 (퐶)) ≔ (1/2, 0, 1/2) and
(푝2 (퐴), 푝2 (퐵), 푝2 (퐶)) ≔ (1/2, 1/2, 0). We can then define a coherent lower expec-
tation 퐸 by 퐸 ( 푓 ) ≔ min{퐸푝0 ( 푓 ), 퐸푝1 ( 푓 ), 퐸푝2 ( 푓 )} for every gamble 푓 ∈ L(X).
For the particular gamble 푓 defined by ( 푓 (퐴), 푓 (퐵), 푓 (퐶)) ≔ (1,−2, 3), the value
of this lower expectation then equals 퐸 ( 푓 ) = min{1/2, 2, −1/2} = −1/2. ♦
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3 Forecasting systems and betting strategies
We now consider a sequential version of the betting game in Section 2 between
Forecaster and Sceptic, by considering a sequence of variables 푋1, . . . , 푋푛, . . . , all
of which take values in our finite sample space X.
On each round of the game, indexed by 푛 ∈ N0 B N ∪ {0}, the a priori
unknown finite sequence of outcomes 푥1:푛 = (푥1, . . . , 푥푛) has been revealed and we
assume that Forecaster’s uncertainty about the next—as yet unknown—outcome
푋푛+1 ∈ X is described by a coherent lower expectation. Hence, on each round of
the game, Forecaster’s uncertainty can depend on and be indexed by the past
states.
All finite sequences 푠 = 푥1:푛 = (푥1, . . . , 푥푛)—so-called situations—are collected
in the set S B X∗ = ⋃푛∈N0 X푛. By convention, we call the empty sequence the
initial situation and denote it by . The finite sequences 푠 ∈ S form an event tree,
and it is on this whole event tree that we will describe Forecaster’s uncertainty,
using a so-called forecasting system.
Definition 3. A forecasting system 퐸• : S → E is a map that associates with
every situation 푠 ∈ S a coherent lower expectation 퐸 푠 ∈ E. The collection of all
forecasting systems is denoted by ES.
Every forecasting system corresponds to a collection of bets that are available
to Sceptic. That is, in every situation 푠 = 푥1:푛, Sceptic is allowed to bet on the
unknown outcome 푋푛+1 according to any gamble 푓 ∈ L(X) such that 퐸 푠 ( 푓 ) ≤ 0
(or 퐸 푠 ( 푓 ) < 0). This leads to an uncertain reward 푓 (푋푛+1) for Sceptic and an
uncertain reward − 푓 (푋푛+1) for Forecaster. Afterwards, when the outcome 푥푛+1 is
revealed, Sceptic gets the amount 푓 (푥푛+1), Forecaster gets the amount − 푓 (푥푛+1)
and we move to the next round. To formalise this sequential betting game, we
introduce the notion of a supermartingale, which is a special case of a so-called
real process.
A real process 퐹 : S → R is a map that associates with every situation
푠 = 푥1:푛 ∈ S of the event tree, a real number 퐹 (푠). With every real process
퐹 there corresponds a process difference Δ퐹 that associates with every situa-
tion 푠 ∈ S a gamble Δ퐹 (푠) on X, defined as Δ퐹 (푠) (푥) B 퐹 (푠푥) − 퐹 (푠) for every
푠 ∈ S and 푥 ∈ X, where 푠푥 denotes the concatenation of 푠 and 푥. We call a real
process 푀 a (strict) supermartingale if 퐸 푠 (Δ푀 (푠)) ≤ 0 (퐸 푠 (Δ푀 (푠)) < 0) for
every situation 푠 ∈ S. Note that a supermartingale is always defined relative to a
forecasting system 퐸•. Similarly, a real process 푀 is called a (strict) submartin-
gale if 퐸 푠 (Δ푀 (푠)) ≥ 0 (퐸 푠 (Δ푀 (푠)) > 0) for every 푠 ∈ S. Due to the conjugacy
relation between upper and lower expectations, 푀 is a (strict) supermartingale
if and only if −푀 is a (strict) submartingale. We collect the super- and sub-
martingales in the sets M(퐸•) and M(퐸•), respectively. A supermartingale 푀 is
called non-negative (positive) if 푀 (푠) ≥ 0 (푀 (푠) > 0) for all 푠 ∈ S.
From the previous discussion, it is clear that Sceptic’s allowable betting
behaviour corresponds to supermartingales or strict supermartingales, depend-
ing on whether we consider acceptable or desirable gambles, respectively. In-
deed, in each situation 푠 = 푥1:푛 ∈ S, she can only select a gamble Δ푀 (푠) for
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which 퐸 푠 (Δ푀 (푠)) ≤ 0 (퐸 푠 (Δ푀 (푠)) < 0) and her accumulated capital 푀 (푥1:푛) =
푀 () +∑푛−1푘=0 Δ푀 (푥1:푘 ) (푥푘+1), with 푀 () being her initial capital, will therefore
evolve as a (strict) supermartingale. As mentioned before, it will turn out not to
matter whether we consider acceptable or desirable gambles, or equivalently, su-
permartingales or strict supermartingales. To be able to explain why that is, we
will proceed with both. In particular, we will restrict Sceptic’s allowed betting
strategies to non-negative (strict) supermartingales, where the non-negativity
is imposed to prevent her from borrowing money. Non-negative supermartin-
gales 푀 that start with unit capital 푀 () are called test supermartingales.
Example 4. Consider a repetition of the experiment in Example 2, and a sta-
tionary forecasting system 퐸• defined by 퐸 푠 ( 푓 ) = 퐸 ( 푓 ) = min{퐸푝0 ( 푓 ), 퐸푝1 ( 푓 ),
퐸푝2 ( 푓 )} for every 푠 ∈ S and 푓 ∈ L(X), with 푝0, 푝1 and 푝2 as in Example 2. An ex-
ample of a non-negative (test) supermartingale 푀 is then given by the recursion
equation Δ푀 (푠) = (Δ푀 (푠) (퐴),Δ푀 (푠) (퐵),Δ푀 (푠) (퐶)) ≔ (−푀 (푠)/2, 푀 (푠)/2, −푀 (푠)/2)
for every 푠 ∈ S, with 푀 () ≔ 1. E.g., for 푠 = 퐴, it follows that 푀 (퐴) =
푀 () + Δ푀 () (퐴) = 푀 () − 푀 ()/2 = 푀 ()/2 = 1/2. It is easy to see that 푀
is non-negative by construction and, for every 푠 ∈ S, it holds that 퐸 푠 (Δ푀 (푠)) =
max{0, −푀 (푠)/2, 0} = 0. ♦
In what follows, we will use Sceptic’s allowed betting strategies—so non-
negative (strict) supermartingales—to introduce a notion of computable ran-
domness with respect to a forecasting system. We denote the set of all infinite
sequences of states—or so-called paths—by Ω B XN and, for every such path
휔 = (푥1, . . . , 푥푛, . . . ) ∈ Ω, we let 휔푛 B (푥1, . . . , 푥푛) for all 푛 ∈ N0.
However, not all betting strategies within the uncountable infinite set of
all allowed betting strategies are implementable. We will therefore restrict our
attention to those betting strategies that are computable, as an idealisation of
the ones that can be practically implemented.
4 A brief introduction to computability
Computability deals with the ability to compute mathematical objects in an
effective manner, which means that they can be approximated to arbitrary pre-
cision in a finite number of steps. In order to formalise this notion, computability
theory uses so-called recursive functions as its basic building blocks [8,10].
A function 휙 : N0 → N0 is recursive if it can be computed by a Turing
machine, which is a mathematical model of computation that defines an abstract
machine. By the Church–Turing thesis, this is equivalent to the existence of
an algorithm that, upon the input of a natural number 푛 ∈ N0, outputs the
natural number 휙(푛). The domain N0 can also be replaced by any other countable
set whose elements can be expressed by adopting a finite alphabet, which for
example allows us to consider recursive functions from S to N0 or from S×N0 to
N0. Any set of recursive functions is countable, because the set of all algorithms,
which are finite sequences of computer-implementable instructions, is countable.
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We can also consider recursive sequences of rationals, recursive rational pro-
cesses and recursive nets of rationals. A sequence {푟푛}푛∈N0 of rational numbers
is called recursive if there are three recursive maps 푎, 푏, 휎 from N0 to N0 such
that 푏(푛) ≠ 0 for all 푛 ∈ N0 and 푟푛 = (−1)휎 (푛) 푎 (푛)푏 (푛) for all 푛 ∈ N0. By replacing
the domain N0 with S, we obtain a recursive rational process. That is, a rational
process 퐹 : S → Q is called recursive if there are three recursive maps 푎, 푏, 휎
from S to N0 such that 푏(푠) ≠ 0 for all 푠 ∈ S and 퐹 (푠) = (−1)휎 (푠) 푎 (푠)푏 (푠) for all
푠 ∈ S. In a similar fashion, a net of rationals {푟푠,푛}푠∈S,푛∈N0 is called recursive if
there are three recursive maps 푎, 푏, 휎 from S × N0 to N0 such that 푏(푠, 푛) ≠ 0
for every 푠 ∈ S and 푛 ∈ N0, and 푟푠,푛 = (−1)휎 (푠,푛) 푎 (푠,푛)푏 (푠,푛) for all 푠 ∈ S and 푛 ∈ N0.
Using these recursive objects, we now move on to define the following mathe-
matical objects that can be computed in an effective manner: computable reals,
computable real gambles, computable probability mass functions and, finally,
computable real processes such as non-negative supermartingales.
We say that a sequence {푟푛}푛∈N0 of rational numbers converges effectively
to a real number 푥 ∈ R if |푟푛 − 푥 | ≤ 2−푁 for all 푛, 푁 ∈ N0 such that 푛 ≥ 푁. A
real number 푥 is then called computable if there is a recursive sequence {푟푛}푛∈N0
of rationals that converges effectively to 푥. Of course, every rational number
is a computable real. A gamble 푓 : X → R and a probability mass function
푝 : X → [0, 1] are computable if 푓 (푥) or 푝(푥) is computable for every 푥 ∈ X,
respectively. After all, finitely many algorithms can be combined into one.
However, a real process 퐹 : S→ R may not be computable even if each of its
individual elements 퐹 (푠) is, with 푠 ∈ S, because there may be no way to com-
bine the corresponding infinite number of algorithms into one finite algorithm.
For that reason, we will look at recursive nets of rationals instead of recursive
sequences of rationals. We say that a net {푟푠,푛}푠∈S,푛∈N0 of rational numbers con-
verges effectively to a real process 퐹 : S → R if |푟푠,푛 − 퐹 (푠) | ≤ 2−푁 for all 푠 ∈ S
and 푛, 푁 ∈ N0 such that 푛 ≥ 푁. A real process 퐹 is then called computable if
there is a recursive net {푟푠,푛}푠∈S,푛∈N0 of rationals that converges effectively to
퐹. Of course, every recursive rational process is also a computable real process.
Observe also that, clearly, for any computable real process 퐹 and any 푠 ∈ S, 퐹 (푠)
is a computable real number. Furthermore, a constant real process is computable
if and only if its constant value is.
To end this section, we would like to draw attention to the fact that the set
of all real processes is uncountable, while the set of all computable real (or recur-
sive rational) processes is countable, simply because the set of all algorithms is
countable. In the remainder, we will denote by MC (퐸•) the set of all computable
non-negative supermartingales for the forecasting system 퐸•.
5 Computable randomness for forecasting systems
At this point, it should be clear how Forecaster’s uncertainty about a sequence
of variables 푋1, . . . , 푋푛, . . . can be represented by a forecasting system 퐸•, and
that such a forecasting system gives rise to a set of betting strategies whose
corresponding capital processes are non-negative (strict) supermartingales. We
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will however not allow Sceptic to select any such betting strategy, but will re-
quire that her betting strategies should be effectively implementable by requiring
that the corresponding non-negative (strict) supermartingales are computable.
In this way, we restrict Sceptic’s betting strategies to a countably infinite set.
We will now use these strategies to define a notion of computable randomness
with respect to a forecasting system 퐸•. The definition uses supermartingales
rather than strict supermartingales, but as we will see shortly, this makes no dif-
ference. Loosely speaking, we call a path 휔 computably random for 퐸• if there is
no corresponding computable betting strategy 푀 that allows Sceptic to become
rich without bounds along 휔, i.e., sup푛∈N0 푀 (휔푛) = +∞, without borrowing.
Definition 5. A path 휔 is computably random for a forecasting system 퐸• if
there is no computable non-negative real supermartingale 푀 ∈ MC (퐸•) that is
unbounded along 휔. We denote the collection of all forecasting systems for which
휔 is computably random by ESC (휔).
It turns out that our definition is reasonably robust with respect to the
particular types of supermartingales that are considered.
Proposition 6. A path 휔 is computably random for a forecasting system 퐸•
if and only if there is no recursive positive rational strict test supermartingale
푀 ∈ MC (퐸•) such that lim푛→∞ 푀 (휔푛) = +∞.
As a consequence, whenever we restrict Sceptic’s allowed betting strategies to
a set that is smaller than the one in Definition 5, but larger than the one in
Proposition 6, we obtain a definition for computably random sequences that is
equivalent to Definition 5. Consequently, it indeed does not matter whether we
restrict Sceptic’s allowed betting strategies to supermartingales or strict super-
martingales.
If we consider binary sequences and restrict Sceptic’s betting behaviour to
non-negative computable test supermartingales, our definition of computable
randomness coincides with the one that was recently introduced by De Cooman
and De Bock for binary sequences [5]. The equivalence is not immediate though
because the forecasting systems in Ref. [5] specify probability intervals rather
than coherent lower expectations. Nevertheless, it does hold because in the bi-
nary case, for every coherent lower expectation, the corresponding closed convex
set of probability mass functions on X = {0, 1}—see Section 2—is completely
characterised by the associated probability interval for the outcome 1. Further-
more, in the case of binary sequences and stationary, precise, computable fore-
casting systems, it can also be shown that our definition of computable ran-
domness coincides with the classical notion of computable randomness w.r.t.
computable probability mass functions [11].
Next, we inspect some properties of computably random sequences 휔 and
the set of forecasting systems ESC (휔) for which 휔 is computably random. We
start by establishing that for every forecasting system 퐸•, there is at least one
path 휔 ∈ Ω that is computably random for 퐸•.
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Proposition 7. For every forecasting system 퐸•, there is at least one path 휔
such that 퐸• ∈ ESC (휔).
Consider now the vacuous forecasting system 퐸• ,푣 defined by 퐸 푠,푣 ≔ 퐸 푣 for every
푠 ∈ S. Our next result shows that the set of forecasting systems ESC (휔) for which
휔 is computably random is always non-empty, as it is guaranteed to contain this
vacuous forecasting system.
Proposition 8. All paths are computably random for the vacuous forecasting
system: 퐸• ,푣 ∈ ESC (휔) for all 휔 ∈ Ω.
Furthermore, if a path 휔 is computably random for a forecasting system 퐸•,
then it is also computably random for every forecasting system that is more
conservative.
Proposition 9. If 휔 is computably random for a forecasting system 퐸•, i.e., if
퐸• ∈ ESC (휔), then 휔 is also computably random for any forecasting system 퐸 ′•
for which 퐸 ′• ≤ 퐸•, meaning that 퐸 ′푠 ( 푓 ) ≤ 퐸 푠 ( 푓 ) for all situations 푠 ∈ S and
gambles 푓 ∈ L(X).
The following result establishes an abstract generalisation of frequency stabil-
isation, on which early notions of randomness—like Church randomness—were
focused [2]. It states that if we systematically buy a gamble 푓 for its coher-
ent lower expectation 퐸 ( 푓 ), then in the long run we will not lose any money.
The connection with frequency stabilisation will become apparent further on in
Section 6, where we present an intuitive corollary that deals with running av-
erages of a gamble 푓 along the infinite sequence 휔 and its computable infinite
subsequences.
Theorem 10. Consider a computable gamble 푓 , a forecasting system 퐸• for
which 퐸• ( 푓 ) is a computable real process, a path 휔 = (푥1, . . . , 푥푛, . . . ) ∈ Ω that is
computably random for 퐸•, and a recursive selection process 푆 : S → {0, 1} for
which lim푛→+∞
∑푛
푘=0 푆(푥1:푘 ) = +∞. Then
lim inf
푛→+∞
∑푛−1
푘=0 푆(푥1:푘 )
[
푓 (푥푘+1) − 퐸 푥1:푘 ( 푓 )
]∑푛−1
푘=0 푆(푥1:푘 )
≥ 0.
6 Computable randomness for lower expectations
We now introduce a simplified notion of imprecise computable randomness with
respect to a single coherent lower expectation; a direct generalisation of com-
putable randomness with respect to a probability mass function. We achieve this
by simply constraining our attention to stationary forecasting systems: forecast-
ing systems 퐸• that assign the same lower expectation 퐸 to each situation 푠 ∈ S.
In what follows, we will call 휔 computably random for a coherent lower expecta-
tion 퐸 if it is computably random with respect to the corresponding stationary
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forecasting system. We denote the set of all coherent lower expectations for which
휔 is computably random by EC (휔).
Since computable randomness for coherent lower expectations is a special case
of computable randomness for forecasting systems, the results we obtained before
carry over to this simplified setting. First, every coherent lower expectation has
at least one computably random path.
Corollary 11. For every coherent lower expectation 퐸, there is at least one
path 휔 such that 퐸 ∈ EC (휔).
Secondly, EC (휔) is non-empty as every path 휔 is computably random for the
vacuous coherent lower expectation 퐸 푣 .
Corollary 12. All paths are computably random for the vacuous coherent lower
expectation: 퐸 푣 ∈ EC (휔) for all 휔 ∈ Ω.
Thirdly, if a path 휔 is computably random for a coherent lower expectation
퐸 ∈ EC (휔), then it is also computably random for any coherent lower expectation
퐸 ′ that is more conservative.
Corollary 13. If 휔 is computably random for a coherent lower expectation 퐸,
then it is also computably random for any coherent lower expectation 퐸 ′ for
which 퐸 ′ ≤ 퐸, meaning that 퐸 ′( 푓 ) ≤ 퐸 ( 푓 ) for every gamble 푓 ∈ L(X).
And finally, for coherent lower expectations, Theorem 10 turns into a property
about running averages. In particular, it provides bounds on the limit inferior
and superior of the running average of a gamble 푓 along the infinite sequence 휔
and its computable infinite subsequences. Please note that unlike in Theorem 10,
we need not impose computability on the gamble 푓 nor on the real number 퐸 ( 푓 ).
Corollary 14. Consider a path 휔 = (푥1, . . . , 푥푛, . . . ) ∈ Ω, a coherent lower ex-
pectation 퐸 ∈ EC (휔), a gamble 푓 and a recursive selection process 푆 for which
lim푛→+∞
∑푛
푘=0 푆(푥1:푘 ) = +∞. Then
퐸 ( 푓 ) ≤ lim inf
푛→+∞
∑푛−1
푘=0 푆(푥1:푘 ) 푓 (푥푘+1)∑푛−1
푘=0 푆(푥1:푘 )
≤ lim sup
푛→+∞
∑푛−1
푘=0 푆(푥1:푘 ) 푓 (푥푘+1)∑푛−1
푘=0 푆(푥1:푘 )
≤ 퐸 ( 푓 ).
When comparing our notion of imprecise computable randomness with the
classical precise one, there is a striking difference. In the precise case, for a given
path 휔, there may be no probability mass function 푝 for which 휔 is computably
random (for example, when the running frequencies do not converge). But, if
there is such a 푝, then it must be unique (because a running frequency cannot
converge to two different numbers). In the imprecise case, however, according
to Corollary 12 and 13, every path 휔 is computably random for the vacuous
coherent lower expectation, and if it is computably random for a coherent lower
expectation 퐸 , it is also computably random for any coherent lower expecta-
tion 퐸 ′ that is more conservative—or less informative—than 퐸 . This leads us
to wonder whether for every path 휔, there is a least conservative—or most
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informative—coherent lower expectation 퐸휔 such that 휔 is computably random
for every coherent lower expectation 퐸 that is more conservative than or equal to
퐸휔, but not for any other. Clearly, if such a least conservative lower expectation
exists, it must be given by
퐸휔 ( 푓 ) ≔ sup{퐸 ( 푓 ) : 퐸 ∈ EC (휔)} for all 푓 ∈ L(X),
which is the supremum value of 퐸 ( 푓 ) over all coherent lower expectations 퐸
for which 휔 is computably random. The crucial question is whether this 퐸휔 is
coherent (C1 and C2 are immediate, but C3 is not) and whether 휔 is computably
random with respect to 퐸휔. If the answer to both questions is yes, then 퐸휔 is
the least conservative coherent lower expectation for which 휔 is computably
random.
The following example illustrates that there are paths 휔 for which this is
indeed the case. It also serves as a nice illustration of some of the results we
have obtained so far.
Example 15. Consider any set {푝0, . . . , 푝푀−1} of 푀 pairwise different, computable
probability mass functions, and any path 휔 that is computably random for the
non-stationary precise forecasting system 퐸•, defined by 퐸 푠 B 퐸푝푛 mod 푀 for all
푛 ∈ N0 and 푠 = 푥1:푛 ∈ S; it follows from Proposition 7 that there is at least
one such path. Then as we are about to show, 휔 is computably random for a
coherent lower expectation 퐸 ′ if and only if 퐸 ′ ≤ 퐸 , with 퐸 ( 푓 ) ≔ min푀−1푘=0 퐸푝푘 ( 푓 )
for all 푓 ∈ L(X).
The ‘if’-part follows by recalling Proposition 9 and noticing that for all 푠 =
푥1:푛 ∈ S and all 푓 ∈ L(X):
퐸 ′( 푓 ) ≤ 퐸 ( 푓 ) = min{퐸푝0 ( 푓 ), . . . , 퐸푝푀−1 ( 푓 )} ≤ 퐸푝푛 mod 푀 ( 푓 ) = 퐸 푠 ( 푓 ).
For the ‘only if’-part, consider for every 푖 ∈ {0, . . . , 푀 − 1} the selection pro-
cess 푆푖 : S → {0, 1} that assumes the value 푆푖 (푥1:푛) = 1 whenever 푛 mod 푚 = 푖
and 0 elsewhere. Clearly, these selection processes are recursive and lim푛→∞∑푛
푘=0 푆푖 (푥1, . . . , 푥푛) = +∞ along the path 휔 = (푥1, . . . , 푥푛, . . . )—and any other
path, in fact. Furthermore, due to the computability of the probability mass
functions 푝푖, it follows that 퐸• ( 푓 ) is a computable real process for any com-
putable gamble 푓 ∈ L(X). For any computable gamble 푓 ∈ L(X), it therefore
follows that
퐸 ′( 푓 ) ≤ lim inf
푛→∞
푛−1∑
푘=0
푓 (푥푖+푘푀 )
푛
≤ lim sup
푛→∞
푛−1∑
푘=0
푓 (푥푖+푘푀 )
푛
≤ 퐸푝푖 ( 푓 ),
where the first and third inequality follow from Corollary 14 and Theorem 10,
respectively, and the second inequality is a standard property of limits inferior
and superior. Since (coherent lower) expectations are continuous with respect
to uniform convergence [13], and since every gamble on a finite set X can be
uniformly approximated by computable gambles on X, the same result holds
for non-computable gambles as well. Hence, for any gamble 푓 ∈ L(X) we find
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that 퐸 ′( 푓 ) ≤ 퐸푝푖 ( 푓 ). As this is true for every 푖 ∈ {0, . . . , 푀 − 1}, it follows that
퐸 ′( 푓 ) ≤ 퐸 ( 푓 ) for all 푓 ∈ L(X).
Hence, 휔 is indeed computably random for 퐸 ′ if and only if 퐸 ′ ≤ 퐸 . Since
퐸 is clearly coherent itself, this also implies that 휔 is computably random with
respect to 퐸 and—therefore— that 퐸휔 = 퐸 . So for this particular path 휔, 퐸휔 = 퐸
is the least conservative coherent lower expectation for which 휔 is computably
random. ♦
However, unfortunately, there are also paths for which this is not the case.
Indeed, as illustrated in Ref. [5], there is a binary path 휔—so with X = {0, 1}—
that is not computably random for 퐸휔 with 퐸휔 ( 푓 ) ≔ 12
∑
푥∈{0,1} 푓 (푥) for every
gamble 푓 ∈ L(X).
Interestingly, however, in the binary case, it has also been shown that while
휔 may not be computably random with respect to 퐸휔, there are always coher-
ent lower expectations 퐸 that are infinitely close to 퐸휔 and that do make 휔
computably random [5].2 So one could say that 휔 is ‘almost’ computably ran-
dom with respect to 퐸휔. Whether a similar result continuous to hold in our more
general—not necessarily binary—context is an open problem. We conjecture that
the answer is yes.
Proving this conjecture is beyond the scope of the present contribution though.
Instead, we will establish a similar result for expectation intervals.
7 Computable randomness for expectation intervals
As a final specialisation of our notion of computable randomness, we now focus
on a single gamble 푓 on X and on expectation intervals 퐼 = [퐸 ( 푓 ), 퐸 ( 푓 )] that
correspond to lower expectations for which 휔 is computably random. We will
denote the set of all closed intervals 퐼 ⊆ [min 푓 ,max 푓 ] by I푓 .
Definition 16. A path 휔 is computably random for a gamble 푓 ∈ L(X) and
a closed interval 퐼 if there is a coherent lower expectation 퐸 ∈ EC (휔) for which
퐸 ( 푓 ) = min 퐼 and 퐸 ( 푓 ) = max 퐼. For every gamble 푓 ∈ L(X), we denote the set
of all closed intervals for which 휔 is computably random by I푓 (휔).
Note that if 휔 is computably random for a gamble 푓 and a closed interval 퐼, it
must be that 퐼 ∈ I푓 ; so I푓 (휔) ⊆ I푓 . This follows directly from C1 and conjugacy.
We can also prove various properties similar to the ones in Section 5 and 6. The
following result is basically a specialisation of Corollaries 11-13.
Proposition 17. Consider any gamble 푓 ∈ L(X). Then
(i) for every 퐼 ∈ I푓 , there is at least one 휔 ∈ Ω for which 퐼 ∈ I푓 (휔);
(ii) for every 휔 ∈ Ω, I푓 (휔) is non-empty because [min 푓 ,max 푓 ] ∈ I푓 (휔);
(iii) for every 휔 ∈ Ω, if 퐼 ∈ I푓 (휔) and 퐼 ⊆ 퐼 ′ ∈ I푓 , then also 퐼 ′ ∈ I푓 (휔).
2 This result was established in terms of probability intervals; we paraphrase it in
terms of coherent lower expectations, using our terminology and notation.
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Moreover, as an immediate consequence of Corollary 14, if 휔 is computably
random for a gamble 푓 and a closed interval 퐼 ∈ I푓 , then the limit inferior and
limit superior of the running averages of the gamble 푓 along the path 휔 and its
computable infinite subsequences, lie within the interval 퐼.
The properties in Proposition 17 lead to a similar question as the one we
raised in Section 6, but now for intervals instead of lower expectations. Is there,
for every path 휔 and every gamble 푓 ∈ L(X), a smallest interval such that 휔 is
computably random or ‘almost’ computably random for this gamble 푓 and all
intervals that contain this smallest interval, but for no other. The following result
is the key technical step that will allow us to answer this question positively. It
establishes that when 휔 is computably random for a gamble 푓 and two intervals
퐼1 and 퐼2, then it is also computably random for their intersection.
Proposition 18. For any 휔 ∈ Ω and 푓 ∈ L(X) and for any two closed intervals
퐼 and 퐼 ′ in I푓 : if 퐼 ∈ I푓 (휔) and 퐼 ′ ∈ I푓 (휔), then 퐼 ∩ 퐼 ′ ≠ ∅ and 퐼 ∩ 퐼 ′ ∈ I푓 (휔).
Together with Proposition 17 and the fact that I푓 (휔) is always non-empty,
this result implies that I푓 (휔) is a filter of closed intervals. Since the intersection
of a filter of closed intervals in a compact space—such as [min 푓 ,max 푓 ]—is
always closed and non-empty [1], it follows that the intersection
⋂I푓 (휔) of all
closed intervals 퐼 for which 휔 is computably random with respect to 푓 and 퐼,
is non-empty and closed, and is therefore a closed interval itself. Recalling the
discussion in Section 6, it furthermore follows that
⋂I푓 (휔) = [퐸휔 ( 푓 ), 퐸휔 ( 푓 )].
Similar to what we saw in Section 6, it may or may not be the case that 휔 is
computably random for the gamble 푓 and the interval [퐸휔 ( 푓 ), 퐸휔 ( 푓 )]; that is,
the—possibly infinite—intersection
⋂I푓 (휔) may not be an element of I푓 (휔).
However, in this interval case, there is a way to completely characterise the
models—in this case intervals—for which 휔 is computably random. To that end,
we introduce the following two subsets of [min 푓 ,max 푓 ]:
퐿 푓 (휔) ≔ {min 퐼 : 퐼 ∈ I푓 (휔)} and 푈 푓 (휔) ≔ {max 퐼 : 퐼 ∈ I푓 (휔)}.
Due to Proposition 17(iii), these sets are intervals: on the one hand 퐿 푓 (휔) =
[min 푓 , 퐸휔 ( 푓 )] or 퐿 푓 (휔) = [min 푓 , 퐸휔 ( 푓 )) and on the other hand 푈 푓 (휔) =[퐸휔 ( 푓 ),max 푓 ] or 푈 푓 (휔) = (퐸휔 ( 푓 ),max 푓 ]. As our final result shows, these two
intervals allow for a simple characterisation of whether a path 휔 is computably
random for a gamble 푓 and a closed interval 퐼.
Proposition 19. Consider a path 휔, a gamble 푓 ∈ L(X) and a closed interval
퐼. Then 퐼 ∈ I푓 (휔) if and only if min 퐼 ∈ 퐿 푓 (휔) and max 퐼 ∈ 푈 푓 (휔).
So we see that while 휔 may not be computably random for 푓 and the interval
[퐸휔 ( 푓 ), 퐸휔 ( 푓 )], it will definitely be ‘almost’ computably random, in the sense
that it is surely random for 푓 and any interval 퐼 ∈ I푓 such that min 퐼 < 퐸휔 ( 푓 )
and max 퐼 > 퐸휔 ( 푓 ). In order to get some further intuition about this result,
we consider an example where 퐿 푓 (휔) and 푈 푓 (휔) are closed, and where 휔 is
therefore computably random for 푓 and [퐸휔 ( 푓 ), 퐸휔 ( 푓 )].
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Example 20. Consider two probability mass functions 푝0 and 푝1, and let the
coherent lower expectation 퐸 be defined by 퐸 ( 푓 ) ≔ min{퐸푝0 ( 푓 ), 퐸푝1 ( 푓 )} for
all 푓 ∈ L(X). Then, as we have seen in Example 15, there is a path 휔 for
which 퐸 is the least conservative coherent lower expectation that makes 휔 ran-
dom. Clearly, for any fixed 푓 ∈ L(X), if we let 퐼 B [퐸 ( 푓 ), 퐸 ( 푓 )], it follows
that
⋂I푓 (휔) = 퐼 ∈ I푓 (휔), and therefore also that 퐿 푓 (휔) = [min 푓 ,min 퐼]
and 푈 푓 (휔) = [max 퐼,max 푓 ]. Note that in this example, by suitably choos-
ing 푝0 and 푝1, 퐼 can be any interval in I푓 , including the extreme cases where
퐼 = [min 푓 ,max 푓 ] or 퐼 is a singleton. ♦
8 Conclusions and future work
We have introduced a notion of computable randomness for infinite sequences
that take values in a finite sample space X, both with respect to forecasting
systems and with respect to two related simpler imprecise uncertainty models:
coherent lower expectations and expectation intervals. In doing so, we have gen-
eralised the imprecise notion of computable randomness of De Cooman and De
Bock [5], from binary sample spaces to finite ones.
An important observation is that many of their ideas, results and conclusions
carry over to our non-binary case. On our account as well as theirs, and in
contrast with the classical notion of (precise) computable randomness, every path
휔 is for example computably random with respect to at least one uncertainty
model, and whenever a path 휔 is computably random for a certain uncertainty
model, it is also computably random for any uncertainty model that is more
conservative—or less informative.
For many of our results, the move from the binary to the non-binary case
was fairly straightforward, and our proofs then mimic those in Ref. [5]. For
some results, however, additional technical obstacles had to be overcome, all
related to the fact that coherent lower expectations are more involved than
probability intervals. Proposition 18, for example, while similar to an analogous
result for probability intervals in Ref. [5], eluded us for quite a while. The key
step that made the proof possible is our result that replacing computable (real)
betting strategies with recursive (rational) ones leads to an equivalent notion of
computable randomness; see Proposition 6.
In our future work, we would like to extend our results in Section 7—that
for every path 휔 and every gamble 푓 , 휔 is ‘almost’ computably random for
a unique smallest expectation interval—from expectation intervals to coherent
lower expectations. That is, we would like to prove that every path 휔 is ‘al-
most’ computably random for a unique maximally informative coherent lower
expectation. We are convinced that, here too, Proposition 6 will prove essential.
Furthermore, we would like to develop imprecise generalisations of other clas-
sical notions of randomness, such as Martin-Lo¨f and Schnorr randomness [2], and
explore whether these satisfy similar properties. Moreover, we want to explore
whether there exist different equivalent imprecise notions of computable ran-
domness in terms of generalised randomness tests, bounded machines etc. [6]
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instead of supermartingales. We also wonder if it would be possible to define
notions of computable randomness with respect to uncertainty models that are
even more general than coherent lower expectations, such as choice functions [4].
Finally, we believe that our research can function as a point of departure
for developing completely new types of imprecise learning methods. That is, we
would like to create and implement novel algorithms that, given a finite sequence
of data out of some infinite sequence, estimate the most informative expecta-
tion intervals or coherent lower expectation for which the infinite sequence is
computably random. In this way, we obtain statistical methods that are reli-
able in the sense that they do not insist anymore on associating a single precise
probability mass function, which is for example, as was already mentioned in
the introduction, not defensible in situations where relative frequencies do not
converge.
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